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Jane Boulden* Open Skies:
The 1955 Proposal and its
Current Revival
I. Introduction
On 21 July 1955, at a four-power summit conference involving France,
Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, President
Eisenhower put forward a proposal calling upon the Soviet Union to
engage in an exchange of military blueprints with the United States and
to accept a system of mutual, unlimited aerial reconnaissance of each
others' territory. Dubbed Open Skies, the proposal was intended to test
the seriousness of the Soviet Union with respect to disarmament
negotiations. It was also intended, if successful, to pull back the veil of
secrecy surrounding the Soviet Union and its military activities.
This paper examines the historical background of the original Open
Skies proposal and traces its development and eventual failure in the
1950s. The intention is to provide a thorough description and analysis of
the rationale for the proposal, its evaluation, and the problems associated
with it. Special attention will be paid to the Canadian response and role
in the negotiations. The 1955 experience is contrasted with the 1989
Open Skies proposal and the 1990 negotiations, but the primary
emphasis is on the 1950s experience.
II. The 1955 Proposal
(i) Context
The July 1955 summit meeting came about in a new atmosphere of
goodwill between the United States and the Soviet Union. This was due
to the completion of a much-delayed peace treaty between the Soviet
Union and Australia in May 1955. On 10 May 1955 the United States,
Great Britain, and France issued an invitation to the Soviet Union to
meet in Geneva. Furthering the atmosphere of hope, on the same day as
the summit invitation was issued, the Soviet Union put forward a
disarmament proposal at the United Nations General Assembly which
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went a considerable distance towards meeting Western ideas about the
need for inspection to ensure compliance with disarmament agreements.
Negotiations on disarmament between the United States and the
Soviet Union had previously been focused on limiting the production and
movement of fissionable materials. In the face of tremendously difficult
technical problems associated with verifying such limitations however,
the emphasis had shifted from controlling fissionable materials to
reducing arms and armed forces giving news impetus to disarmament
negotiations. The Geneva Summit and the Open Skies proposal thus
came at a time when there was a new sense of hope about the possibility
of working with the Soviet Union coupled with a desire to bring down
the levels of arms and armed forces of the major powers.
(ii) Origins of the Proposal
Having issued the summit invitation to the Soviet Union, the United
States needed to determine what should be discussed. In an effort to
generate ideas about what might be proposed by the United States,
Nelson Rockefeller, then special assistant to the President, organized a
meeting of a group of experts at the Quantico marine base in Virginia.
The Quantico Panel's recommendations were based on the
knowledge, presented and discussed at the meetings, that while the
United States enjoyed an advantage over the Soviet Union in most areas
of military capability, that advantage was in danger of eroding over the
next five years. Given that reality, the Panel decided that a summit
proposal must be designed to test Soviet seriousness about disarmament.
If the Soviet Union proved not to be serious, the United States could
embark on a major programme of spending and development to ensure
that its lead remained intact.
The Panel concluded that the reunification of Germany and a serious
disarmament agreement were the two most important objectives for the
United States. It was recognized that without inspection, that is, without
a way of finding out about Soviet military activities, there could not be
a worthwhile arms control agreement. A good test of the seriousness of
the Soviet Union was thus to see how willing it was to agree to intrusive
inspection.
The idea of mutual aerial inspection was proposed by Max Millikan
from MIT who had heard the idea discussed at an arms control session
in Cambridge) The panel liked the idea and decided to include it in their
1. W.W. Rostow, Open Skies (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982) at 30.
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recommendations. The Quantico Report thus recommended that the US
suggest two agreements:
1. An agreement for mutual inspection of military installations, weapons,
and armaments. Until experience has been developed on the feasibility of
such inspection, this agreement would not make provision for arms
limitation. Its purpose would be to provide knowledge and evidence on
the basis of which a control plan could be devised.
2. A convention insuring the right of aircraft of any nationality to fly
freely over the territory of any country for peaceful purposes. The
possibility of abuse of this right could be prevented by the establishment
of safety located control points for the international inspection and
registration of aircraft for flights across international boundaries. The
convention would be so drawn as not to interfere in any way with any
nation's right to control for economic reasons commercial activities of
foreign aircraft.2
The Quantico Report was submitted to Rockefeller on 10 June 1955.
The Report was given a wide distribution, but support for the mutual
aerial inspection proposal was not immediately forthcoming. In July,
Rockefeller personally presented the proposal to President Eisenhower.
The President was interested in the idea, but Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles was hesitant. Dulles was uncertain about the proposal itself
and was also worried that the US might make a proposal at the summit
for the sake of the moment, which in the long run might prove not to be
in the best interests of the US.'
The issue remained undecided right up until the summit meeting was
underway. Rockefeller and some of his staff were located in Paris in
order to be close to Geneva if the proposal should suddenly be placed on
the agenda.
In the few days prior to the summit, Rockefeller used his time to gain
the support of some key people including Admiral Radford, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Robert Anderson, The Deputy Secretary of
Defense. On 20 July, Rockefeller and the other advisors who had been
stationed in Paris were called to Geneva. On the evening of 20 July the
Paris crowd, along with the advisors already stationed in Geneva, met
with President Eisenhower to discuss whether a proposal for aerial
inspection should be made.
Dulles, the last of the President's key advisors to withhold approval,
was converted to the idea by its potential for "drama and substance" with
2. Ibid, at 30-3 1.
3. For disussions of the differences in the approach of Rockefeller and Dulles see: Rostow,
Open Skies, at 34-56., also: M. Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York: Random House,
1988) at 296-297.
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no accompanying risk to the US. With the support of other key advisors
already in place, it was quite quickly agreed that such a proposal should
be made.
(iii) The Proposal
Eisenhower had laid the groundwork for the Open Skies proposal in his
opening speech on 18 July 1955. He stated:
Surprise attack has a capacity for destruction far beyond anything which
man has yet known .... Perhaps, therefore, we should consider whether
the problem of limitation of armament may not best be approached by
seeking - as a first step - dependable ways to supervise and inspect
military establishments, so that there can be no frightful surprises, whether
by sudden attack or by secret violation of agreed restrictions. In this field
nothing is more important than that we explore together the challenging
and central problem of effective mutual inspection. Such a system is the
foundation for real disarmament.4
The actual proposal was made three days later on the afternoon of 21
July 1955. Speaking partly from a prepared text and partly off the cuff,
Eisenhower reiterated his belief that "No sound and reliable agreement
can be made unless it is completely covered by an inspection and
reporting system adequate to support every portion of the agreement. ' 5
He went on to propose:
I should address myself for a moment principally to the Delegates from the
Soviet Union, because our two great countries admittedly possess new and
terrible weapons in quantities which do give rise in other parts of the
world, or reciprocally, to the fears and dangers of surprise attack. I
propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that we begin an
arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves - immediately. These
steps would include: [t]o give each other a complete blueprint of our
military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our
countries to the other; lay out the establishments and provide the
blueprints to each other. Next, to provide within our countries facilities for
aerial photography to the other country - we to provide you the facilities
within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you
can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country
to study, you to provide exactly the same facilities for us .... Likewise we
will make more easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of
disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a
beginning.6
4. "Statement by President Eisenhower", The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government,
July 18-23, 1955 (Washington DC: Department of State, Publication 6046) at 21.
5. Ibid, at 57.
6. bid, at 58.
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(iv) Soviet Reaction
The immediate Soviet reaction to the proposal was subdued, but not
entirely negative. In his memoirs, Eisenhower recalls:
For a time it appeared that the intransigent Soviet refusal to permit any
useful inspection system in the USSR might be effectively shaken. The
proposal, Bulganin declared, seemed to have real merit, and the Soviets
would give it complete and sympathetic study at once. The tone of his talk
seemed as encouraging as his words and my first reaction was that the
assurance of isolation of inspection teams from the populations,
eliminating any possible political indoctrination by such detachments,
might prove to be a lead to progress between us.7
Eisenhower's optimism was short-lived however. Later that day,
Khrushchev told Eisenhower that he did not agree with Bulganin's
response: "From that moment until the final adjournment of the
conference, I wasted no more time probing Mr. Bulganin; I devoted
myself exclusively to an attempt to persuade Mr. Khrushchev on the
merits of the Open Skies plan, but to no avail. He said the idea was
nothing more than a bald espionage plot against the USSR, and to this
line of argument he stubbornly adhered".8
(v) Other Proposals
While Open Skies became the centerpiece of the summit, the other three
powers present also put forward proposals of their own. The Soviet
Union reiterated its proposal of 10 May at the General Assembly for the
establishment of ground observation posts as safeguards against surprise
attack.9 Great Britain proposed that a system of joint inspection of the
forces in Europe be established in order to generate "increasing mutual
confidence" in Europe. The system would also provide practical
information that would be useful in setting up an inspection system for a
future disarmament agreement. 0 France proposed that states agree to a
set reduction in military expenditures, the savings to be contributed to a
fund for international development and assistance."
(vi) Directive
The final statement of the summit, approved by all four powers, outlined
7. D.D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1963) at 521.
8. bid
9. "Proposal by the Soviet Delegation", The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government
op.cit at 55-56.
10. "Memorandum by the United Kingdom Delegation", Ibid., at 59, 64-66.
11. "Memorandum by the French Delegation", Ibid., at 60-62.
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their agreement to work towards the development of a system of
disarmament through the Subcommittee of the United Nations
Disarmament Commission, 2 and to take the deliberations of the Summit
under consideration when undertaking the negotiations.' 3
(vii) Disarmament Subcommittee Activity 1955
On 5 August 1955, Bulganin told the Supreme Soviet that the conditions
for international control through a proposal such as Open Skies do not
exist, and stated that the Soviet Union had told the US that: "....
aerophotography can not give the expected results, because both
countries stretch over vast territories, in which, if desired, one can conceal
anything."' 14
(viii) Proposed Implementation of Open Skies
In spite of the apparent negative attitude of the Soviet Union, when the
United Nations Disarmament Committee (UNDC) subcommittee began
its deliberations on 29 August 1955, the US submitted an outline of how
Open Skies might be implemented.
The implementation plan incorporated the Soviet Union's 10 May
proposal for establishing ground control posts to monitor troop
movements at key points to guard against dangerous concentrations of
military forces. It consisted of three main elements: an exchange of
blueprints of military establishments; unrestricted, monitored aerial
reconnaissance; and ground observers stationed at key locations.
Exchanges of blueprints would include: ". . .identification, strength,
command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of
all major land, sea and air forces, including organized reserves and
paramilitary forces; and a complete list of military plants, facilities, and
installations with their locations.15
Exchanges of information would be carried out progressively with
schedules drawn up for "time phasing of exchanges to assure
simultaneous delivery of similar types of information"1 6 This information
would be subject to immediate spot-checking. On-the-spot observers
12. The Subcommittee consisted of representatives from Canada, France, Great Britain, the
US and the USSR.
13. "Directive of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers to the Foreign Ministers",
Ibid at 67-68.
14. "Excerpts from Bulganin's Report on Geneva Conference", New York Times (5 August
1955) at 4.
15. Annex 20, Document DC/71, in: United Nations, Disarmament Commission Official
Records, 4th Year, 1955, Supplement for April to December 1955, at 38.
16. Ibid
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would be posted with land, sea and air forces as well as at key points to
verify the blueprints exchanged. This ground observation system would
be supplemented by an aerial reconnaissance system in which each party
would have the right to undertake unlimited, but monitored aerial
reconnaissance of the other's territory.
Each country would use its own aircraft and equipment for aerial
reconnaissance. Every reconnaissance flight would include a representa-
tive of the host country. Each country would provide designated sites
which would support the aerial reconnaissance mission. Procedures for
designating entry and exit points, clearing observers, airplanes and crews
and the control of air traffic would be determined through further
negotiation.
(ix) Response
The primary Soviet objection to the Open Skies proposal was that it did
not include any form of arms reduction or control. At the Geneva
meeting of Foreign Ministers in October 1955, Soviet Foreign Minister
Molotov expressed some willingness to accept aerial photography as a
form of verification, but only in the final stage of an agreement to reduce
armaments and eliminate atomic weapons. 17
A second Soviet objection was that the proposal did not involve other
countries and foreign military installations of the US. In a letter to
President Eisenhower, Chairman Bulganin stated that the Soviet Union
had no objection in principle to the proposal for an exchange of
information on armed forces and armaments, but thought that such
information should be submitted by all states to an international control
organisation. He went on to say: "It is impossible not to see that the
proposal introduced by you completely omits from consideration armed
forces and military installations which are outside the area of the United
States and the Soviet Union. And yet it is perfectly self-evident that aerial
photographing should also be extended to all armed forces and military
installations located on the territories of those other states.' 8
(x) UN General Assembly Open Skies Resolution
In December 1955, Resolution 914(x) of the General Assembly urged
members of the UNDC subcommittee to continue their efforts towards
17. B.G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations from Arms Control (Washington DC: Brookings,
1961) at 315.
18. "Letter from Chairman Bulganin to President Eisenhower, September 19, 1955",
Background of Heads of Government Conference, 1960 (Washington DC: Department of
State, Publication no. 6972, April 1960) at 20.
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developing a comprehensive disarmament agreement.' 9 Special emphasis
was to be placed on achieving agreement on the Open Skies proposal.
The resolution was passed by a vote of 56 to 7 with no abstentions. The
Soviet bloc voted against the resolution, reiterating their belief that
disarmament was the first priority.
At the end of December 1955, perhaps in response to the UNGA
resolution, Khrushchev delivered a speech in which he attacked the US
and rejected the Open Skies plan.20 However, at the same time, the US
had begun a high-level campaign to win acceptance of the proposal. This
campaign included an exhibition in New York city which demonstrated
how the system would work.21
Little substantive progress was made in the UNDC subcommittee
during 1955. To a certain extent this was due to the shift in emphasis
from previous Western positions which had concentrated on controlling
fissionable materials. The change in goals contributed to a lack of a
coherent Western position and the Soviet Union was able to take
advantage of this fact.
(xi) Disarmament in 1956
Negotiations on disarmament underwent a period of transition in 1956.
Two new shifts in emphasis were evident. First, Eisenhower's Open Skies
proposal and the May 1955 Soviet proposal on ground control posts had
encouraged (and been symbolic of) a desire to develop methods to warn
against surprise attack. Second, an overall shift to searching for "partial"
measures of disarmament, or the "first step approach", which had begun
in 1955, took hold in 1956.
Little substantive progress was made overall and although a few new
proposals were made, much of the time was taken up by minor shifts in
positions. For its part, the US was undergoing a major policy review
which was not completed until late in the year.
(xii) Demonstration Test Area
The only new action on the Open Skies idea was a US proposal to
establish a zone in which the technique of aerial inspection and ground
observation could be demonstrated and refined. The proposal required a
test area which was between 20,000 and 30,000 square miles in size and
19. UNGA Resolution 914 (X), 16 December 1955.
20. W. Hangen, "Khrushchev Attacks Eisenhower, Rejects his Air Inspection Plan; President
Weighs Long-Term Aid", New York Times (30 December 1955) at 1, 4.
21. K. Teltsch, "US Asks Priority for Aerial Checks in UN Arms Talks", New York T1imes (3
December 1955) at 1, 2.
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did not include any sensitive military installations. For purposes of the
experiment, a permanent naval installation, an air force unit, and an army
combat unit should be stationed in the area and would be subject to
reciprocal inspection.
In response, the representative from the Soviet Union, Andrei
Gromyko, strenuously objected to the fact that Open Skies contained no
disarmament measures. "If we study the US working paper more closely,
we shall see that the focal point of that document is the question of
control and that this question is presented in such a manner as in fact to
divorce it from any concrete or practical measures of disarmament....
the point is that these measures are tied to a number of specific conditions
which are impossible of fulfillment, which are not feasible. '22
On 27 March 1956 the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution to
the Subcommittee which called for an agreement on reducing
conventional armaments. This agreement would occur without any link
to reductions in nuclear armament and was put forward as a partial
measure. The draft resolution included provisions for the establishment of
an international control organ which would establish ground control
posts along the lines proposed in the Soviet Union's May 1955
proposal. 23
(xiii) Canadian Response
Canada was the first country to officially endorse the Open Skies
proposal. Speaking before the Disarmament Commission in October
1955, Canadian representative Paul Martin praised the Eisenhower plan
as a first step towards the larger goal of disarmament. Mr. Martin
emphasized the need for increased confidence and that the Open Skies
plan would go a long way to help promote confidence. In response to the
Soviet objection that there is no guarantee of future reductions, Mr.
Martin said: ". . . a partial answer is better than no answer at all". 24 And
in sum, the Canadian Government saw the plan as: ". . . a reasonable
nucleus around which an initial and limited agreement could be
developed, and a most convenient approach to the solution of a problem
which is so urgent and apparently otherwise intractable. '25
Canada's first major policy statement on disarmament since the Open
Skies proposal, was made on 5 July 1956. Mr. Martin supported the
22. UN Doc. DC/SC.I/PV.82, 23 April 1956, at 22-23.
23. Annex 5, Document DC/83, (1956) Disarmament Commission Official Records (New
York: United Nations, 1957) at 9.
24. UNDC/PV.46, 21 October 1955, United Nations, (1955) Disarmament Commission
OfficialRecords (New York: United Nations, 1956) at 6.
25. Ibid
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trend towards partial measures and suggested that the first stage should
include measures to give early warning of surprise attack and limits on
nuclear weapons. Specifically, preliminary tests of inspection procedures,
as proposed by the US, should be carried out.
The Open Skies proposal was supported as a way of building
confidence and guarding against suprise attack:
... the Canadian Government attaches importance to the establishment of
effective warning systems against surprise attacks, as an integral part of
such a disarmament programme. It was for that reason that we welcomed
the initiative taken in July 1955 by the President of the United States...
and the proposals put forward by Mr. Bulganin,. . .We consider that the
early application of the procedures envisaged through a reciprocal
programme of aerial reconnaissance and observation from control posts
on the ground should be an integral part of the early stages of such a
programme of disarmament. These measures, as we see it, not only would
help to lay a basis for the effective control of an agreed program of
disarmament, but would greatly reduce - if not prevent - the possibility
of surprise attack. Such a reciprocal warning system is needed if we are to
move forward from a co-existence based on mutual fear to the prospect of
co-operation based on mutual confidence.26
In the wake of the Open Skies proposal discussion within the Canadian
Government began on whether there was a role for Canada to play in
such a system. The US proposal on a possible demonstration test area,
made in early 1956, prompted some thought about the possibility of
using the Arctic area for such a test. The idea of developing an
arrangement in the Arctic to guard against surprise attack (perhaps as a
demilitarized area) had previously been discussed in a limited way. As
the US was undertaking its policy review in 1956, Canada began quietly
feeling out the US and the UK as to whether a proposal involving the
Canadian Arctic might be useful.
(xiv) Acceptance in Principle and Discussions on Zones
For the most part, the time since Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal
was spent groping for a way forward which could engender support from
both sides. Throughout this period, President Eisenhower and Soviet
Chairman Bulganin engaged in an exchange of correspondence. The
letters covered a variety of subjects and were instrumental in establishing
the future path of the disarmament negotiations.
In a 17 November 1956 letter to President Eisenhower dealing with
the military situation in Egypt, Chairman Bulganin enclosed a
26. DC/PV.53, 5 July 1956, United Nations (1956), Disarmament Commission Official
Records, op.cii at 3.
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"Declaration of the Soviet Government Concerning the Question of
Disarmament and the Reduction of International Tension". Inter alia, the
document included a formal expression of willingness to consider a form
of Open Skies within Europe. ". . . the Soviet Government for the
purpose of facilitating the quickest achievement of agreement is prepared
to consider the question of using aerial photography in the area in Europe
where basic military forces of the North Atlantic Pact are located and in
countries participating in the Warsaw Pact to a depth of 800 kilometers
to the East and West from the line of demarcation of the above-
mentioned military forces, if there is agreement of the appropriate
states." 2
7
This change in the Soviet position opened the way for more directed
negotiations. It was in some ways an unusual time for decisions to move
forward. The US and the Soviet Union were experiencing increasingly
tense relations due to the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the French and
British military activity in Egypt. However, the two sides returned to the
UN in January 1957 apparently anxious to move ahead on new fronts.
(xv) The New US Position
The new US policy on disarmament, unveiled in February 1957, was
based on five objectives: the reduction of nuclear weapon stockpiles;
prevention of surprise attack; lessening the burden of armaments;
ensuring that research and development in space is for peaceful means
only; and, to ease tensions and facilitate the settlement of political issues.
In the proposals put forward to meet these objectives, the US suggested
that ". . . progressive installation of inspection systems" would guard
against the possibility of surprise attack. To this end, the US reiterated its
willingness to carry out the Open Skies plan.28 This represented a major
shift in the US policy on Open Skies. The Eisenhower proposal was put
forward as a prerequisite to the comprehensive disarmament agreement,
with a view to instituting a system which would be used to carry out such
an agreement. The US was now holding out Open Skies as a way of
preventing surprise attack.
(xvi) The Move to Two Zones
In conjunction with the Soviet willingness to consider aerial inspection in
the European zone, the change in US policy opened the way for
27. "Letter from Chairman Bulganin to President Eisenhower, November 17, 1956",
Background of Heads of Government Conference 1960, op.cit at 94.
28. Statement by Ambassador Lodge before the First Committee, Department of State
Bulletin, 11 February 1957, at 225-228. Also: DC/SC. 1/PV.88, 19 March 1957.
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discussions about progressively expanding regional inspection zones.
Discussions now concentrated on determining where the zones should be
located. On 9 April 1957, the US proposed a European zone bounded by
5 degrees longitude E., in the west, 30 degrees longitude E., in the east
and 45 degrees latitude N., in the south. The triangular-shaped zone,
ended at the North Pole. A second zone was also proposed which took
in Alaska in Part of Soviet territory in the Far East.29
The Soviet Union responded on 30 April with a proposal for
reductions in conventional forces and armaments in Europe. It
incorporated previous Soviet proposals for ground observation posts and
included an acceptance of the European zone proposed by the US with
some revisions. The Soviet Union objected to the boundaries of the US
zone because it included a large portion of the Warsaw Pact and a
smaller portion of NATO. The proposed revisions moved the median line
of the US zone closer to the dividing line in Germany and moved the
zone itself slightly to the south with a northern boundary of 54 degrees
N. latitude. The Soviet Union also proposed an expansion of the zone in
the Far East, bringing in larger portions of US and Soviet territory. The
result would give each side roughly equal areas of inspection -
7,129,000 square kilometres in USSR and 7,063,000 in the US.30
Much of the debate centered on the need to find zones that were
roughly equivalent in size as well as in their contents. For example, a
zone which included part of the territory of the US was not considered
equivalent to an equal area of the Soviet Union if that area in the Soviet
Union contained few military or industrial installations.
In Europe, the problem of defining zones was politically difficult. The
US did not like the Soviet proposal because it would perpetuate the
division of Germany, which the US was seeking to end. However, the
Soviet Union felt that the US proposed zone was too one-sided in its
inclusion of Warsaw Pact territory. A European zone also complicated
the negotiations since those European countries included in the zone
would have to be consulted and included in the final decision.
(xvii) An Arctic Zone
The exchange of European zone proposals brought agreement on an
inspection system within reach. In an effort to continue the positive
atmosphere surrounding these negotiations, US Secretary of State Dulles
announced in May that the US would be willing to consider a non-
European zone if agreement on Europe was not possible. Dulles stated:
29. Disarmament Commission Official Records, 1957.
30. Annex 7, DC/105, Disarmament Commission OfficialRecords, 1957, at 28-29.
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"We attach a top priority to getting a substantial inspection zone
wherever we can get it quickly. Now, if we can get it quickly in relation
to Europe, that is acceptable to use. If we can't get it quickly as regards
some other area which is substantial enough so that it involves a real test
of good faith and enables the significance and the requirements of aerial
and ground inspection to be tested out, then we take that other area."31
In a mid-May press conference Dulles suggested that a zone in the
Arctic regions might be the solution. Such a zone had little political
significance and would allow the two sides to obtain some practical
experience in inspection techniques. When questioned, Dulles stated that
the Canadian Government has been consulted and that Canada had
indicated that it was "sympathetically disposed to moving along those
lines". 32
(xviii) Consultation
During June and July 1957, NATO members consulted with the US on
proposals which might be offered to the Soviet Union. Just prior to
leaving for the final NATO consultations, Secretary of State Dulles
announced that the US would be willing to open up all of its North
American territory under a reciprocal inspection regime. He also said that
the US was consulting with Canada on the possibility of including
Canada in such a package, although an Arctic zone would still be
possible as a first step.33
(xix) Formal Proposal
On 2 August 1957 Dulles formally presented the new proposals to the
UNDC Subcommittee on behalf of Canada, France, Great Britain, and
the US. Two alternative inspection options were presented, both were to
be associated with the entry into force of a first-stage disarmament
agreement and would be geared towards safeguarding against possible
surprise attacks.
In the first case, the entire territory of the continental United States,
including Alaska, along with the territory of Canada and the Soviet
Union would be open to inspection. If the Soviet Union refused this
proposal, a more limited zone encompassing all US, Soviet Union,
31. "Statement of Secretary Dulles in Press Conference, 29 May 1957" Department of State
Bulletin, 17 June 1957, at 965-966.
32. "Record of the Dulles News Conference on Arms and World Affairs" New York Times
(15 May 1957) at 10.
33. "Radio and Television Report to the Nation by the Secretary of State", Department of
State, Press Release 430, 22 July 1957.
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Canadian, Danish and Norwegian territory north of the Arctic Circle was
possible.
Two zones were proposed in Europe. The first zone would encompass
territory bounded by 40 degrees N. latitude, 10 degrees W. longitude and
60 degrees E. longitude. Alternatively, a more limited zone could be
discussed, but must include territory in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union.
A decision on one zone was dependent on the other. The Soviet Union
could not choose to accept the Arctic zone and not also accept a
European zone. The US proposed that a technical working group be
established immediately to discuss the technical details of such a system.34
(xx) The Soviet Response
The Soviet response came on 27 August 1957. In a strongly worded
reply, the Soviet Union charged that it had tried to meet the European
zone proposals halfway and that the Western powers had now proven
their lack of good intentions by putting forward proposals for new zones.
The Soviet Union charged the US with trying to find a way to prepare
for attacking the Soviet Union under the guise of disarmament.
It is clear from the statements of the political and military leaders of the
United States that the military chiefs of the United States and NATO
would like to obtain for their use, by means of aerial surveys, the fullest
possible information on the location of the Soviet Union's most important
industrial and communications centers. It is obvious that the object of this
United States proposal is the collection of reconnaissance data; that it
would not result in an improvement but rather in a deterioration of the
international situation; an that its real purpose is to contribute to the
preparation of aggressive war, not to the removal of the threat of war.35
The Soviet Union also objected to the exclusion of foreign bases from the
Western proposal and stated that the Arctic proposal could: ". . scarcely
be taken seriously, for flights over barren, sparsely-inhabited stretches of
the Arctic would yield no information useful either for disarmament or
for the prevention of a surprise attack ...,36 Referring to the Western
proposal as a "trick" the Soviet Union criticised the concept of aerial
photography, stating that it would not shift disarmament out of its current
deadlock and would not prevent surprise attack.
In spite of the Soviet condemnation of the proposals, on 29 August
1957, the four Western powers submitted a working paper outlining their
34. Annex 1, DC/ 113, (1957-1958) Disarmament Commission OfficialRecords, at 57-58.
35. Annex 4, DC/ 113, Ibid, at 69.
36. Ibid, at 70.
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ideas about how an inspection zone might be implemented. In a
controversial move, the working paper linked progress on any one of the
proposals to progress on the others: "This working paper is offered for
negotiation on the understanding that it's provisions are inseparable.
Failure to fullfil any of the provisions of the Convention would create a
situation calling for examination at the request of any party. '37
(xxi) The Canadian Position
In a statement on the day of the presentation of the working paper to the
Subcommittee, Charles Ritchie expressed Canada's support for the four
power proposals. He declared that with respect to the inspection
provision: "We are willing not only to accept the various measures of
inspection proposed, but also to contribute, within our capabilities, to the
manning, equipment, installation and maintenance of the various systems
envisaged." 38 In a statement before the United Nations General
Assembly, Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker reiterated
Canada's support for the proposals. He noted that Canada faced surprise
attack threats from the Arctic regions and stated that Canada had no
aggressive intentions against the Soviet Union.39
(xxii) Subcommittee Activities Draw to a Close
During the final 1957 meetings of the Subcommittee, the committee
failed to establish an agenda for future work, or to agree on a date for the
resumption of talks. A variety of factors played a role in bringing this
situation about. Within the Soviet Union a battle over the top leadership
position was occuring at the Kremlin and in the summer of 1957,
Khrushchev emerged as the victor.
Similarly, the US was experiencing difficulties in maintaining a
coherent disarmament staff. Harold Stassen had been acting as the US
representative at the negotiations. During 1957 the question of whether
negotiating positions he had put forward at the negotiations had been
approved by the Administration or whether he had been given free rein
created some controversy in Washington and led to some readjustments
of personnel within the US delegation.
Finally, nuclear testing had emerged as a central issue for discussion. A
ban on nuclear testing was a goal that had garnered support from a large
number of countries around the world and was seen as a concrete
37. Annex 5, Ibid, at 78.
38. Annex 9, Ibid, at 98.
39. "Canada and the United Nations", Statements and Speeches, 57/33, Ottawa, Department
of External Affairs, 23 September 1957, at 5.
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measure that would be a major step along the road to controlling nuclear
weapons. Testing proposals thus received an increasing amount of
attention, drawing the emphasis away from longer-term comprehensive
disarmament proposals.
(xxiii) Open Skies at the Security Council
After the Soviet dismissal of the inspection zones proposed by the West
in 1957, it seemed that Open Skies would be put aside as an issue for
negotiation. However, a further opportunity for proposing an Open Skies
arrangement in the Arctic presented itself in April 1958 when the Soviet
Union lodged a complaint in the United Nations Security Council about
US bomber flights over the Arctic in the direction of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union claimed that the US had frequently sent bombers
loaded with hydrogen and atomic bombs across the Arctic towards the
Soviet Union in response to warning signals from the Distant Early
Warning (DEW) line. The Soviet Union called the bomber flights a
"direct provocation". In an effort to ensure that the situation did not
develop into one which might threaten peace, the Soviet Union
submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council calling upon the US
to cease the flights.4°
In response, the US representative reminded the Security Council that
the Soviet Union had turned down a Western proposal to undertake
mutual aerial inspection of the Arctic region and suggested that the Soviet
concerns could be dealt with if they would agree to undertake the
technical studies previously proposed with a view to developing such a
system.41
In protest to the way the Security Council meeting was carried out the
Soviet Union withdrew its draft resolution. At that point that United
States chose to take the initiative and on 28 April 1958, President
Eisenhower requested a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the
possibility of establishing an inspection system for the Arctic.
The US proposal called for a zone of inspection which would include
all territory north of the Arctic Circle in the territories of Canada,
Denmark, Norway, the US and the Soviet Union along with Canadian,
US and Soviet territory west of 140 degrees W. longitude, east of 160
degrees E. longitude and north of 50 degree N. latitude. This area was
deemed to be a principal area for surprise attack and the proposal asked
40. Un Doc. S/PV.813, 21 April 1958, at 7, (1958) Security Council Official Records, (New
York: United Nations, 1958).
41. Ibid,at 11.
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those countries involved to undertake technical discussions of the type of
arrangements which might be established.42
The Soviet Union spoke against the US resolution. It claimed, as it had
done in the past, that such a proposal did little to prevent surprise attack
and that it was an attempt on the part of the US to gather espionage
information about the Soviet Union.
In an unusual step, the Secretary General of the United Nations spoke
in favour of the US proposal at the Security Council meeting. He said:
"The stalemate in the field of disarmament has been permitted to last far
too long. Attempts to break it through negotiations have so far proved of
no avail ..... Such initiatives as those ... today being considered by the
Security Council, are steps which could make a dent in the disarmament
problem. They might have a major impact if treated in good faith... And
they could, if followed through, provide a first frail basis for the
development of some kind of trust. ' '43
(xxiv) The Soviet Veto
The vote on the US resolution was taken on 2 May 1958. Ten of eleven
Security Council members voted in favour of the resolution. The eleventh
member, the Soviet Union, used its veto to defeat the resolution.
The Security Council resolution was as clear as any of the Open Skies
proposals had ever come to fruition. However, the use of the veto by the
Soviet Union was not a surprise, given previous Soviet responses to
Arctic zone proposals. A press report after the vote quoted a US
spokesperson as saying that the US would continue to look for alternative
proposals, but that they "won't continue to beat on a locked door".44
(xxv) Canadian Position
Prior to the debate in the Security Council, Canadian Prime Minister
John Diefenbaker wrote to Khrushchev and offered to allow Soviet
inspection of Canadian territory in return for reciprocal rights in the
Soviet Union: "I give assurance that in the context of a disarmament
agreement the Canadian government would be willing to open all or part
of Canada to aerial and ground inspection on a basis of reciprocity. It
seems to me that this is the type of proposal which should prove
attractive to both our countries since we are neighbours across the
Arctic". 45
42. Un Doc. S/PV.814, 29 April 1958, at 7-9, Ibid
43. Un Doc. S/PV.815, 29 April 1958, at 17-18, lbid
44. L. Parrott, "Won't Stop Trying", Globe and Mail (5 May 1958) at 1.
45. Quoted in: House of Commons Debates, 11 February 1960, at 991.
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During the Security Council debate, Canada's representative, Charles
Ritchie, reiterated Canada's willingness to open up its territory to
inspection. Mr. Ritchie made clear that the Canadian Government
understood the implications of its acceptance of such a proposal:
We recognize that the establishment of a system of safeguards which
included Canadian territory would mean that there might be international
teams of observers, equipped with electronic devices and the necessary
communications, stationed in Canada, with certain rights of inspection
and freedom of movement. We further recognize that foreign aircraft for
international inspection purposes might be authorized to fly over Canada
and that logistical support elements for such aircraft would probably be
stationed in Canada. We also recognize that Canada might well be called
upon to provide personnel, aircraft and other kinds of support as a
contribution to the system. These various obligations are considered
acceptable in principle, subject to the negotiation of the details on an
equitable basis.46
After the failure of the US resolution at the Security Council, Prime
Minister Diefenbaker wrote to Khrushchev again, stating: "Let me repeat
here, Mr. Chairman, that we stand by our offer to make available for
international inspection or control any part of our territory, in exchange
for a comparable concession on your part .... When there is by your
own admission, a danger of nuclear war breaking out by accident of
miscalculation, it is difficult for Canadians to comprehend your refusal to
engage even in technical discussions intended to explore the feasibility of
an international system of control. ' 47 Later that month Khrushchev
responded by reminding Diefenbaker of the Soviet offer for a European
zone; he did not respond directly to the offer of reciprocal inspection in
the Arctic. 48
(xxvi) The Surprise Attack Conference
During his ongoing correspondence with Khrushchev, President
Eisenhower proposed that the two countries take part in a technical
conference on measures to prevent surprise attack. Khrushchev
responded positively to the proposal and the terms of reference were
established in further correspondence. The conference was to deal with
practical methods of preventing surprise attack, although the Soviet
Government stated that the recommendations should be for methods
working in conjunction with "definite steps in the field of disarma-
46. UN Doc. S/PV.815,29 April 1958, at 3.
47. Quoted in "NATO and Istanbul", (Howard Green), Statements and Speeches, 60/16,
Ottawa, Department of External Affairs, 9 May 1960.
48. Response quoted in House of Commons Debates, 11 February 1960, at 971.
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ment. '' 49 The conference ran from 10 November to 18 December 1958
and involved ten countries, ten Western countries and ten from the
Eastern bloc.
Open Skies was a proposal that did not play a role at the conference,
but systems of aerial reconnaissance were discussed. The US submitted a
series of working papers, among them a discussion of a system of aerial
observation for monitoring long-range bomber forces. Under this system,
any country involved would be subject to a complete aerial survey which
would be supplemented by ground observation and inspection to military
airfields.
The Soviet proposals concentrated on the European region. Along
with proposals for a nuclear-free zone in central Europe, the Soviet
Union repeated its proposal for a central European zone which would be
subject to aerial and ground inspection. In a new twist, the Soviet Union
also proposed that an aerial inspection zone which included eastern
Siberia and the western half of the US, and a zone over Iran, Japan and
Okinawa, be established. Following the Western lead, the Soviet Union
linked acceptance of the Soviet-US zone proposal to acceptance of a
ground-aerial inspection zone in Europe.
These proposals were far more detailed than previous Soviet proposals
had been, but revealed a narrow approach to the inspection issue. The
aerial inspection provisions allowed representatives of "the other side" to
accompany the air groups but inspection teams would photograph their
own country. The photographs would be processed and interpreted by a
centre at which both sides were represented.50
Although the technical conference was considerably more successful in
developing the substantive issues than the UN Subcommittee had been,
the discussions were suspended in December 1958 and were not
reconvened.
(xxvii) Nuclear Testing and the U-2
It was not until late 1959 that the four major powers agreed to
procedures for continuing with discussions on disarmament.51
Negotiations therefore did not resume until 1960. The proposals for
mutual inspection zones continued to play a role in the larger
disarmament proposals. However, there was little separate discussion of
49. "Note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the American Embassy Regarding Surprise
Attack Negotiations", Department of State Bulletin, 24 November 1958, at 816.
50. Bechhoeffer, op.cit. at 480.
51. In part this delay was due to an ongoing debate about the enlargement of the
Disarmament Commission.
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the idea. This set of disarmament negotiations were overshadowed by
discussions on limiting nuclear testing. They were further waylaid by the
cancellation of a planned summit meeting in May 1960.
The May 1960 summit meeting was cancelled in the political fallout
from the shooting down of a US reconnaissance plane, the U-2, over the
Soviet Union on 1 May 1960. The unilateral US reconnaissance flights
being carried out by the U-2 had been going on since 1956, one year after
the Open Skies proposal had been made, and the plane itself was under
development at the time Eisenhower first made his proposal. There is no
evidence that the Open Skies proposal was made in an effort to find a
legal way of carrying out a mission the US was going to go ahead with
anyway. Although Open Skies would clearly make the U-2 flights more
acceptable, this specific motive was not a driving force in the making of
the proposal.
Along with the prominence of the nuclear testing issue, two other
developments led to the fading of the Open Skies question. The advent
of ballistic missiles, as carriers of nuclear weapons, in the late 1950s,
changed the nature of the reconnaissance equation. Warning time
between the launching of a nuclear attack and its arrival was shortened.
The attack could now come from outer space as opposed to an attack by
bombers. Most importantly, ballistic missile launching installations were
thought to be easily concealed from aerial reconnaissance.
A second technological innovation was the use of satellites for
reconnaissance purposes. Although satellite photography did not provide
an identical capability to aerial reconnaissance, the ability of a nation to
carry out such surveillance without infringing on national airspace
quickly gained prominence and acceptance.
(xxviii) The Canadian Offer Stands
After the shooting down of the U-2, Canadian Prime Minister
Diefenbaker announced that the previous offer to the Soviet Union for a
mutual inspection arrangement was still in place.52 Inspection and Open
Skies however, had faded from the agenda of the superpowers and no
response to the offer was made.
(xxix) Open Skies Revived
Open Skies as a proposal, received relatively little attention between the
early 1960s and 1989. Aerial reconnaissance as a method played a
52. "Western Policy Re-Examined", Statements and Speeches, 60/21, Ottawa, Department
of External Affairs, 5 June 1960, at 5.
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general role in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament
and in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) Talks that
took place between NATO and the Warsaw Pact between 1973 and
1988. In an era of satellite photography, aerial reconnaissance remains as
a useful method of verification.
Aerial reconnaissance has also played a role in peacekeeping. Under
the Sinai agreements, for example, the UD carried out aerial surveillance
over the zones in question until the Israeli withdrawal. In this instance,
aerial reconnaissance was one of a number of different methods of
verification used to verify the Sinai agreements. 53
In September 1986, the twenty-three members of the NATO and
Warsaw Pact alliances, along with twelve other neutral and non-alligned
European states, signed the Stockholm Declaration on Confidence and
Security-building Measures in Europe (the Stockholm Declaration).M
The purpose of the declaration was to provide a system of monitoring
and observation of major military activities in Europe. A combination of
aerial and ground inspection measures, similar in theory to the combined
Open Skies and Soviet ground control posts proposal, are included in the
Declaration. Each inspection team is accompanied by a member of the
host government. The aircraft to be used is chosen by mutual consent.
The flight path is controlled by the inspectors who also furnish the
equipment needed.
III. Revival
(i) The Bush Proposal
In the first foreign policy speech of his Presidency, on 12 May 1989,
George Bush revived the Open Skies idea. President Bush needed to seize
the initiative in the arms control field in order to overcome the general
perception that the Soviet Union was providing creative proposals with
major concessions while the US was playing a reactive role. The revival
of the Open Skies proposal thus came as part of a package of "new" ideas
which were to restore the initiative to the US.
As part of a call to the Soviet Union to entrench its new policy of
openness, Bush made reference to the original Eisenhower proposal and
said:
53. See: B. Mandell, The Sinai Experience: Lessons in Multimethod Arms Control Verification
and Risk Management, (Ottawa: Arms Control Verification Studies no. 2, Department of
External Affairs, September 1987).
54. Document of the Stockholm Conference: On confidence and security-building measures
and disarmament in Europe convened in accordance with the relevant provisions of the
concluding document of the Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, September 1986.
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Let us again explore that proposal, but on a broader, more instrusive and
radical basis - one which I hope would include allies on both sides. We
suggest that those countries that wish to examine this proposal meet soon
to work out the necessary operational details, separately from other arms
control negotiations. Such surveillance flights, complementing satellites,
would provide regular scrutiny for both sides. Such unprecedented
territorial access would show the world the meaning of the concept of
openness.5"
In a later speech in Europe, Bush reiterated the proposal while noting that
it would contribute to arms control verification: "Satellites are a very
important way to verify arms control agreements. But they do not
provide constant coverage of the Soviet Union. An Open Skies policy
would move both sides closer to a total continuity of coverage, while
symbolizing greater openness between East and West.5 6
An initial reaction from the Soviet Union came in a commentary on
the Bush speech in the Soviet newspaper Pravda, which criticised the
President's ideas as "offers from the past". 57
(ii) The Canadian Position
During meetings with President Bush in Washington, prior to the 12 May
speech, Prime Minister Mulroney expressed his support for the revival of
the Open Skies proposal. The Prime Minsiter responded positively to the
announcement of the proposal and stated his willingness to open
Canadian territory to short-notice inspection flights as part of an Open
Skies programme, calling on other NATO allies to lend their support to
the idea. 8
In an editorial in the New York Times, Canada's Secretary of State for
External Affairs, Joe Clark, said that Open Skies should be supported
because of the important contribution it could make to arms control
verification. He placed particular emphasis on the fact that all nations
participating in the programme would have the technology available and
be able to take part on the basis of their own capabilities.
Only large countries have satellites in the skies. Yet, if we are to have
conventional arms control in Europe, it is essential that all parties to the
agreement have the ability to assure their publics, on the basis of their own
55. "US-Soviet Relations: A New Policy for the 1990s: Remarks Delivered by President
George Bush to Texas A&M University; (Ottawa, United States Embassy Text, 89-25) 12 May
1989.
56. "Bush Speech Outlines Four Proposals 'To Help Europe Become Whole and Free"'
(Ottawa, United States Embassy Text, 89-33) 1 June 1989.
57. "Bush's Texas Speech Repeats 'Offers from the Past"' Pravda (16 May 1989) in FBIS-
Soviet Union (16 May 1989) at 13.
58. "Prime Minister Welcomes President Bush's Call for 'Open Skies' and Offers to Include
Canada" Press Release, Prime Minister's Office, 12 May 1989.
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judgments, that these agreements are being adhered to, and that their
security is intact. . . . The verification of a conventional arms control
agreement, especially if defenses are to be greatly reduced will require
continuous monitoring to prevent a rapid military build-up and to
maintain confidence that a surprise attack is not being planned.59
(iii) Soviet Response
The initial Soviet response was a quiet questioning but, not complete
rejection of the idea. However, at a meeting held from 22-23 September
1989 between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shavardnadze and US
Secretary of State James Baker at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, the two sides
agreed "in principle" to the Open Skies concept and stated their
willingness to attend an international conference on the idea. According
to the US State Department, the concept would initially be limited to
members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and would be based on flight
quotas established according to the geographic size of states.60
(iv) The NATO Basic Elements Paper
On 15 December 1989 NATO released its "Basic Elements" paper
outlining its initial ideas on how the Open Skies system should be
organised. The paper stated: "The basic purpose of Open Skies is to
encourage reciprocal openness on the part of the participating states and
to allow the observation of military activities and installations on their
territories, thus enhancing confidence and security. 61
The proposals suggested a system based on quotas but with no
restrictions on areas to be overflown within states. Flights could be
conducted jointly by states within the same alliance and members of the
alliances would decide among themselves how to share the information
acquired. Host country observers would be permitted on the inspecting
aircraft during flight. Some sensors, particularly devices for gathering
signals intelligence, would be prohibited, but this would be decided at the
negotiations.62
(v) Open Skies Conference
A first negotiating session on Open Skies, involving all members of
NATO and the Warsaw Pact was held from 12-28 February in Ottawa.
59. J. Clark, "Don't Dismiss Open Skies", New York Times (5 June 1989) at 25.
60. US Department of State, US Geneva Mission Text, 23 September 1989, cited in Arms
Control Reporter 1989 Brookline Mass.: IDDS, 1989) at 850.273.
61. "Open Skies Basic Elements", NATO Press Release, Annex to M-2(89)46, 15 December
1989.
62. Ibid
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The Open Skies idea, having been proposed by the US, was now being
carried and advocated publicly by Canada, with support from Hungary.
On 6 January 1990 Canada responded to a Hungarian invitation to
conduct an overflight of Hungarian territory as a demonstration of the
type of overflights that would be conducted under Open Skies and as a
gesture of goodwill. A reciprocal Hungarian flight over Canada was part
of the plan. However, Hungary was not immediately able to carry out the
overflight and it was considered possible that the Soviet Union might
carry out such a flight on Hungary's behalf.
The first two days of the Ottawa meeting were attended by the foreign
ministers of the NATO and Warsaw Pact members. Although all of the
opening speeches expressed a desire for Open Skies and a belief that such
a system was within reach, the question of German reunification took
precedence. Beneath the heavy media attention to the German question
however, was the emergence of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact response to
the ideas put forward in the NATO Basic Elements paper.
Prior to the Ottawa conference there had been relatively little
information available about the nature of the Warsaw Pact position and
there was some question of whether a common position would even be
developed. Although the Warsaw Pact position was not as detailed as the
NATO Basic Elements paper, it was clear that some fundamental
differences between the two sides existed.
(vi) Different Approaches
The Warsaw Pact called for a regime which would be based on a
common fleet of aircraft and sensors in contrast to the NATO idea where
each country would use its own aircraft. The Warsaw Pact also proposed
that all information gathered on the overflights be processed through a
common data processing centre and be available to all parties to the
agreement. The overflight system outlined by the Warsaw Pact would be
considerably more limited than the NATO proposal in the number of
overflights permitted and in terms of the types of sensors that could be
used.
After the foreign ministers left the Ottawa meeting, the negotiations
broke into four working groups: aircraft and sensors; quotas; flight
mission and safety; and, legal issues. Considerable progress was made on
developing a joint draft treaty text. However, when the negotiations drew
to a close at the end of February, there remained a number of important
divergences between the two sides. In a new and interesting twist, it
appeared that, with the exception of the Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact
members were willing to move to a compromise on key issues. However,
Soviet intransigence on key questions, such as quotas, and insistence that
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Soviet territory could only be overflown by aircraft provided by the
Soviet Union, meant that some important obstacles stood in the way of
a final agreement. 63
(vii) The Budapest Meeting
A second round of negotiations took place in Budapest on 23 April 1990.
It had been hoped that a final agreement could be reached by 12 May,
the first anniversary of the Bush proposal. However, there had been little
change in the Soviet position since the Ottawa meeting in February.
Continued disagreement over the types of sensors to be permitted, quota
numbers, and a Soviet desire that foreign military bases be included in the
agreement soon led the delegations to abandon the 12 May deadline.
64
The four working groups established in Ottawa continued to work on
the framework established in Ottawa. The negotiations ended on 11 May
1990. Although a third round of negotiations might occur, no definitive
date has been established. There was some hope that new impetus might
come from the meeting between Presidents Gorbachev and Bush at the
Washington Summit in June. However, the absence of any new
movement from either side at the summit suggests that the question is
now low on the list of priorities for both superpowers.
(viii) Key Elements and Related Issues
This section will examine the purpose, the planned scope, and
implementation procedures of the first incarnation (1955-1960) of the
Open Skies proposal. The political, legal, and military issues associated
with the proposal will also be discussed.
(ix) Purpose
The original purpose of the Open Skies proposal, as initially put forward,
was to attempt to develop a control or inspection system which could be
used to verify a disarmament agreement. It was the US position that
verifying a disarmament agreement was inherently difficult and that prior
to any final agreement, there must be complete confidence that an
adequate system of inspection was possible and available.
63. R. Howard, "Talks on Open Skies Adjourn Amid Impasses" Globe and Mail (28 February
1990) D. Todd, S. Das, "Soviet Pessimistic about Success as 1st Round Ends Without Deal",
Ottawa Citizen (28 February 1990) at A5.
64. C. Bohlen, "Open Skies' Talks Hit Snag, Cutting Chances of Pact in May", New York
Times (24 April 1990) at A14, A. Ferguson, "Soviet Departure sends Open Skies into
Nosedive, Toronto Star (29 April 1990) at H3, "'Open Skies' Parties Drop Deadline for a
Deal", New York Times 5 May 1990, at A5.
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At the Quantico meetings, where the proposal was first developed, an
inspection scheme was chosen as a way of testing the seriousness of the
intentions of the Soviet Union. Depending on the response, the US could
then go ahead with disarmament or choose the opposite course.
On a specific level, the plan involved an exchange of data on military
installations, troop levels, and armaments (blueprints). The exchange
would then be verified by a system of aerial reconnaissance and observers
on the ground (the latter was incorporated after the original proposal was
made). Each side would be certain of the capabilities of the other prior
to beginning reductions and would also be confident of the ability of the
inspection system to ensure adequate compliance.
Quite quickly after the proposal was first made, the prevention of
surprise attack became the second and, later, more prominent purpose of
the plan. In this light, mutual aerial surveillance, accompanied by ground
observers at key points would act as an ongoing contribution to
confidence and a safeguard against preparations of surprise attack by
ensuring that there were no major changes in troop concentrations and
movements.
1. Scope
(i) Geographical Coverage
Originally, Open Skies was to apply to the territory of the US and the
Soviet Union. Once the Soviet Union agreed to discuss aerial inspection,
the discussion shifted towards the idea of beginning with a trial area and
progressively expanding the system from there. However, in choosing
zones it quickly became apparent that there was difficulty in choosing
two areas which were roughly equivalent in their military and security
value to each country. Eventually this was one of the reasons for
suggesting Arctic zones. It was thought that the relatively small number
of important installations in the area would make the Arctic area a good
first step.
In the end, a variety of zones were discussed. Using part of central
Europe, with variations on the inclusion of US and Soviet territory were
the most popular choices. Both the US and the Soviet Union had a large
concentration of troops in Central Europe and this area was therefore
also the area in which there was fear of surprise attack. Zones in the Far
East and over Japan were also proposed by the Soviet Union, but these
were never pursued.
(ii) The System
Open Skies was to be comprised of three main elements: an exchange of
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blueprints; ground observation teams at key locations; and, mutual aerial
reconnaissance.
(a) Exchange of Blueprints
The exchange of blueprints was to involve: "... the identification,
strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and
equipment of all major land, sea and air forces, including organized
reserves and paramilitary forces; and a complete list of military plants,
facilities, and installations with their locations. '65
When negotiations shifted to concentrate on different zones, the
requirements for data also changed. In these cases the data required were
envisaged as encompassing the same type of information as required in
the original proposal, but information would only be required on those
military forces, facilities and armaments located within the zone.
Movements in and out of the zone would be monitored by ground and
aerial observations.
(b) Ground Observers
Ground observers would be stationed with the operating forces in
question and at military installations and key points such as ports, railway
junctions and major roads. They would monitor the movement of troops
and armaments. Information collected by the observers could be further
checked by aerial reconnaissance. Conversely, questions that arose as a
result of an aerial reconnaissance check could be investigated by the
ground observation teams.
(c) Aerial Reconnaissance
Each side would be entitled to unlimited, but monitored, aerial
reconnaissance of the other's territory. A representative from the host
government would be permitted on each flight. The flights, with prior
notification, could take place as often as requested. Under a multilateral
arrangement, for example a system for a European zone, the permission
of the other states involved would need to be obtained.
(iii) Implementation66
To a certain extent the nature of the implementation process depended on
whether the Open Skies proposal was considered on its own, or as part
65. Annex 20, Un Doc. DC/71, 1955, at 38.
66. Due to the fact that the US and the Soviet Union never actually entered into detailed
negotiations on Open Skies, the implementation details are limited. The information in this
section comes from a number of sources but primarily: "Fact Sheet on Aerial Inspection",
prepared by the White House Disarmament Staff, 28 September 1957, as quoted in W.J.
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of a larger disarmament proposal. For the most part, this differentiation
did not greatly affect the implementation ideas.
(iv) Using the Aircraft
Each side would establish a permanent base in the other country from
which they would operate the reconnaissance missions. Alternatively,
points of entry could be designated for the incoming aircraft. Other air
bases would be used only in the case of an emergency.
Each side would use their own aircraft and, as noted above, a
represenative from the host country would have the right to be on each
flight. It is possible that special markings for the plane would be designed,
or agreed to by negotiation, to distinguish it from the other aircraft (the
use of the UN logo was considered). The aircraft would be subject to
inspection by the host government prior to the reconnaissance flight.
Special equipment, such as radiation detectors, might be used to ensure
that no weapons are concealed on board. The agreement would require
that the inspection process not unduly delay the flight of the aircraft.
(v) Exchanging Information
An agreed method of exchanging the military blueprints and other
important information such as flight plans would need to be established.
This might take place in an international control organization established
as part of a larger treaty, or as a strictly bilateral exchange.
A schedule for when to exchange designated types of information
would be developed by mutual agreement to avoid unstable situations
and ensure that simultaneous exchanges occur. In the initial US plan
there was provision for immediate spot-checking of the information
exchanged. This procedure was never the subject of detailed discussion
between the two sides.
(vi) Restrictions on the Aircraft
The aircraft must be unarmed. Arrangements for adhering to air traffic
control regulations would be negotiated and the crews would be required
to keep within the regulations. Beyond this limitation, the aircraft would
be free to travel and photograph anywhere within the geographic zone
subject to the agreement.
The reconnaissance aircraft would be monitored at all times during its
flight, either electronically or through visual contact by an aircraft from
Levison, "Capabilities and Limitations of Aerial Inspection", Inspection for Disarmamen4 S.
Melman Ed., New York, Columbia University Press, 1958, also: US Outline, Annex 20, UN
Doc., DC/71, October 1955.
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the host country (which could be armed). If the inspecting aircraft
deviated from its flight path it could be forced to land, either by the
accompanying host-country aircraft or by an interceptor aircraft. Similar
procedures might be established for aircraft entering or leaving the zone
or states in question.
(vii) Information Collection
The information collected on an inspection flight would be completely
controlled by the inspecting country unless otherwise specified in the
agreement. Possibly, if a central control organisation was established
under the agreement, the information could be processed and distributed
jointly.
(viii) Ground Observations
The number of observers on each team and their observation rights
would be determined by negotiation. Generally, it was envisaged that the
ground observers would be based at key locations - railway junctions,
major ports, major roadways as well as with the air, navy and ground
forces in question. The observers would work in conjunction with the
aerial inspection mission, the limits of their geographical scope
corresponding to those of the aerial reconnaissance zone. Aerial
inspections may occur in response to inspection needs raised by the
ground observers or vice versa.
2. Political Aspects
(i) Use or Abuse of Information
One of the initial reactions of the Soviet Union was to claim that the
Open Skies plan was a US attempt to conduct espionage missions against
the Soviet Union. In the 1950s the Soviet Union was a very closed
society, especially with respect to its military activities. Given the
openness of US society the Open Skies plan could be interpreted as a way
of "getting in" to the Soviet Union. Since the plan was not accompanied
by reductions in weapons, the Soviet Union suggested that the US simply
wanted to collect information about the Soviet Union with a view to
using it against them later.
On a broader level, information could be abused by either side for the
purpose of preparing for surprise attack rather than to guard against one.
There is no clear way to prevent this from happening other than to rely
on the reconnaissance rights contained in the system itself to generate
warning signals of such activity.
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Two other responses are possible to an Open Skies system. First, such
an extensive system may encourage concealment. In the current situation,
where reconnaissance satellites are in common usage and a base of
knowledge about the other side already exists, this is less of a likelihood,
since many checks on activity and information exist. However, during the
1950s, concealing military equipment from aerial reconnaissance was not
thought impossible. This was particularly thought to be a problem with
missiles, which were just beginning to be developed as nuclear weapon
delivery vehicles.
Second, the gathering of specific information about the opponent's
military capabilities could include an arms race. Precise knowledge about
the capabilities of the other side could encourage a build-up in those
systems or capabilities in which it was discovered that the other side was
more advanced than previously thought.
(ii) Unbalanced Approach
The accusation that the Open Skies plan was an espionage plot against
the Soviet Union was symptomatic of a general sense that the plan
favoured the US and discriminated against the Soviet Union because of
differences in the two societies. McGeorge Bundy notes:
... Eisenhower's proposal, taken by itself, was unbalanced. It is quite true
that in a larger sense there was and is a Soviet interest in avoiding the kind
of American response that fear and ignorance might generate. But it is
hardly surprising that leaders still living in the shadow of the all-powerful
and all-suspicious Stalin should have been slow to understand the wider
advantage of Eisenhower's proposal and quick to observe its immediate
one-sidedness ..... There is no evidence that anyone concerned with the
Open Skies proposal ever addressed the question of finding a way to offer
a balancing incentive in return for Soviet agreement to aerial inspection.
Instead the Americans held to the view that since as a matter of logic
inspection was essential to any reliable agreement, their proposal required
no balancing concession. 67
Indeed, as indicated in the first section of this paper, the proposal received
approval by Dulles, only after its "no-risk" attributes were made clear to
him. From the Soviet vantage point, it was difficult not to see the
proposal, so comprehensive in its nature and yet without any guarantees
of reductions in arms after its implementation, as a political ploy by the
US. This problem was the most important obstacle to moving the Open
Skies idea beyond the proposal stage.
67. M. Bundy, Danger and Surviva4 op.cil at 302.
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(iii) Choosing a Zone
As the negotiations developed, emphasis shifted away from the original
Open Skies idea to a beginning based on a limited geographical zone.
Finding a zone which suited the political needs of each side proved to be
difficult.
Within Europe, an agreeable zone needed to meet a number of
criterion: the need to include relatively equal levels of forces from both
sides; the need to include roughly equal amounts of territory on both
sides; if Soviet territory was included in a European zone, how would
that be balanced by the US; the US would not agree to a zone that would
perpetuate the division of Germany.
The difficulties inherent in this type of balancing act contributed to the
attraction of an Arctic zone. A zone in the Arctic would have relatively
clear demarcation lines and include a small number of military
installations. However, the disadvantage was that imbalance again played
a role since the Soviet Union had more military installations and more
population within the Arctic areas envisaged than the US.
In the 1956 proposal for a test system, the US put forward
specifications for a test zone based on equal numbers of troops and
installations rather than geographic limits. Although discussion of this
proposal never progressed to a detailed stage, it may have provided a way
past the difficulties associated with territorial-oriented zones.
(iv) Legal Questions
Clearly, entry of another state's airspace for purposes of aerial
reconnaissance without the permission of the state involved is illegal. This
was made clear by the shooting down of the U-2 aircraft in May 1960.
However, there is no legal restriction barring a state from deciding to
enter into an agreement with another state which gives that state the right
to carry out aerial reconnaissance missions over its territory. In 1965
Dennis Aronowitz concluded: Nothing in the Constitution forbids the
United States, acting under any of its powers, to give any of its rights in
the airspace to others, including foreign governments or international
organizations. 68 The question becomes more complex when a number of
states are involved. However, the basic premise still applies which is that
each state, within its rights as a sovereign nation, is free to make a
decision on whether to participate in such a system. No state could be
included in an inspection zone without having given its consent.
68. D.S. Aronowitz, Legal Aspects of Arms Control Verification in the United States (New
York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1965) at 137.
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3. Military Aspects
(i) The Advantage of Knowledge
One of the primary military advantages to come from an Open Skies
system is the confirmed, detailed knowledge of the opponent's military
capabilities and the access to ongoing information about the opponent's
activities that is obtained. This works to decrease the level of distrust
between the states involved and provides warning of any effort to prepare
for a surprise attack. On the downside, knowledge of the opponent's
capabilities may lead to the opposite reaction and encourage concealment
and strengthening of military forces and even preparation for attack.
(ii) Reciprocity and Intrusiveness
On the other side of the coin, there are important military implications
for a system in which one's own military capabilities become known to
the opponent. In the debates about the Open Skies proposal within the
US this factor did not play a major role. To some extent it was assumed
that the openness of US society meant that there would not be a great
deal the Soviet Union would learn that it did not already know, or at
least have a good idea about. The proposal never came close enough to
fruition to determine whether this might have become an important issue
when faced with the reality of Soviet inspection.
(iii) Technical Issues
The Open Skies system as envisaged would involve a three stage process:
information gathering, information processing (developing the film and
interpreting the results), and generating an intelligence evaluation based
on those results. In terms of gathering the information, broad aerial
searches would determine the accuracy of the data provided in the
exchange of blueprints. At the same time, more specific aerial searches
would be monitoring major military installations and troop concentra-
tions to keep ongoing watches on important military activities as a
safeguard against surprise attack.
(iv) Time Factors
Estimates at the time of the Open Skies proposal determined that it
would take six months to undertake a complete photographic study of
the US or the Soviet Union. The estimate was given by the Assistant to
the President for Disarmament, Harold Stassen. He noted that: "Starting
from opposite sides of the country, 2 standard United States Air Force jet
planes can now photograph a band of terrain, given favorable weather,
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490 miles wide and 2,700 miles long, the distance from New York to Los
Angeles in only 2 hours".69
While the technical capabilities were thus sufficient to meet the
requirements of the system, there was some question about the ability to
adequately handle the amount of data that would be generated by such
comprehensive reconnaissance. Detailed estimates done by Walter
Levison of Boston University suggested that:
... data reduction constitutes a problem of major proportions. The task of
examining the 225,000 photograph yielded by the total area search
mission in a period of thirty days, for example, is not unreasonable for a
group of fifty skilled photointerpreters. With some augmentation, such a
group could cope with the returns from the specific objective mission as
well. However, in order to make the most of the group's efforts, techniques
for gaining rapid access to previous coverage will have to be developed
and equipment designed for rapid indexing, storage and retrieval. These
must of necessity play a significant role in the success or failure of such an
inspection system.70
This problem is eased somewhat if the system incorporates ground
inspectors. Ground inspection teams can act as an alternative source of
information and also as a check of information or analysis generated by
the aerial system.
(v) Finding Ballistic Missiles
Although experts of the time agreed that aerial reconnaissance could
meet the inspection requirements, there was some fear that this would not
be the case once ballistic missiles were introduced. It was thought that if
an inspection system was in place prior to the preparations of ballistic
missile sites, this would be a manageable problem because the
preparations would be detected by aerial reconnaissance. However, if the
system did not come into being until after the sites had been established,
the problem would become more difficult: "Well-camouflaged
installations, conceivably for the most part under ground, when
completed will present the problem of detection of extremely small object
sizes. The task of identifying undergound launching sites may be
compared to the task of discerning manhold covers from 50,000 feet in
69. US Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Control and Reduction ofArmaments (Hearing,
Part 1) 25 January 1956, at 7.
70. W.J. Levison, "Capabilities and Limitations of Aerial Inspection", Inspection for
Disarmament S. Melman, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958) at 73, see also
Levison's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Control and Reduction of
Armaments (Hearing, Part 5) 9 April 1956.
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the air. Ground inspection would be of even less value in this situation
71
Some of the issues discussed here were of importance when the Open
Skies proposal was proposed because certain technologies - satellites
and ballistic missiles - were still under development. Other issues which
were not discussed at the time or only treated lightly would have been
resolved during the negotiation process if the proposal had ever reached
an advanced stage of agreement.
IV. Conclusions
(i) The Canadian Role
Canada played an important role in the 1950s debates on Open Skies
because of the involvement of its territory and because of its involvement
in the UN Subcommittee negotiations. The Canadian Government felt
that it could play a useful role in carrying out any Open Skies agreement
by providing personnel and resources and by contributing its territory.
Above all, it was the contribution to disarmament and the prevention of
surprise attack, that might have been achieved by the great openness
envisaged under Open Skies, that led to the full support the Canadian
Government gave to the idea.
Canada has played a leading role in the current discussions as well.
The revival of the Open Skies proposal draws on traditional Canadian
support for confidence-building measures and its very strong expertise in
verification. On the political side of the equation, one of the Canadian
and US motives for giving such vigorous support to the Open Skies is a
desire to assure West European members of NATO that both Canada
and the US are willing to accept intrusive inspection from Warsaw Pact
members. This relates to the possible agreement on reducing
conventional forces in Europe. If implemented, such an agreement would
require very intrusive, very extensive verification measures in Western
Europe with limited, if any, intrusiveness required on both US and
Canadian territory. Because Open Skies involves both US and Canadian
territory, the two countries can demonstrate their willingness to share
some of the burden of intrusiveness.
From the Canadian perspective, Open Skies will also help entrench the
North American connection to Europe at a time when changes in Europe
many encourage an increased separation between European and North
American interests (this phenomenon is often referred to as a two-pillared
NATO).
71. Levison, "Aerial Inspection", op.cil at 74.
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(ii) Some Comparisons
During the 1950s the Open Skies proposal took on a variety of forms in
a variety of forums. Its initial purpose was to test Soviet seriousness on
disarmament and to develop an inspection system prior to developing a
disarmament agreement. At it's height it was to form a basis for a system
of safeguards for preventing surprise attacks. In the end, because of it's
lack of connection to measures which limited or reduced arms an thus its
political tilt, the proposal never came within reach of a final agreement.
When President Bush revived the Open Skies idea in May 1990, it was
with an emphasis on formalizing a new Soviet openness on military
matters and building on changes in the NATO-Warsaw Pact relationship
by creating a confidence-building system which would also aid arms
control.
The NATO position, discussed above, envisages a system based on
quotas. It proposes an upper limit on the number of overflights to be
accepted by each state, but intends that frequent overflights should be
permitted. overall it is thought that a rough equivalence in total quotas
should be established between the two alliances. The Soviet Union
wanted a very low quota number, around 30, as compared to NATO
suggestions of around 150 for each alliance. Under the 1955 proposal the
US and the Soviet Union would have had the right to unlimited numbers
of overflights. Both the current and past proposals would allow flights
over any part of the state's territory, with no restricted areas (some
provision for safety restrictions was discussed in both cases).
Under the NATO proposal, a state wishing to undertake an overflight
will be required to give 16 hours notice of arrival at the designated point
of entry of the country to be inspected. The inspecting state will file a
flight plan within six hours of arrival. At this point there will be a 24 hour
period for inspection and servicing of the aircraft and checking the flight
plan for safety reasons. Host country observers will be present during the
flight and will have unrestricted access to all parts of the aircraft. During
the flight, loitering, that is remaining over a given area for an extended
length of time, will not be permitted.
The Soviet Union initially advocated that the aircraft be provided by
the country being inspected and that host nation crews be used to fly the
plane. This would mean that an overflight of the Soviet Union would be
carried out in a Soviet aircraft with a Soviet crew. The Soviet Union
argued that this would allow the host country to be sure than no
prohibited sensors or equipment were on board the plane. They later
suggested that national aircraft might be prepositioned so that the host
country could carry out inspections or that an international airfield be
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dedicated to inspection aircraft and national aircraft could be
prepositioned there for inspection.
Two other issues, sensors and the use of information, have been points
of divergence between the two sides. Again, the Soviet Union advocated
strict limits on sensors while NATO wanted to allow sensors that would
have an all-weather capability. The other Warsaw Pact nations were
willing to accept NATO suggestions for sensors, such as synthetic
aperture radar and infrared sensors, on the condition that these
technologies would be made available to Warsaw Pact nations. Under
the NATO plan, information may the shared within the alliance
according to rules established by each alliance. However, the Soviet
Union wants a common data-processing centre where all parties would
have access to all information gathered.
The first difference between the Eisenhower Open Skies proposal and
the concept currently under consideration is the inclusion of all members
of the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances in the current system. Although
the current proposal is thus wider in its geographic scope, it is more
limited in its substances. In the 1950s there was little discussion of the
types of sensors that would be used and potential limitations on them.
The primary concern was ensuring that the overflying aircraft was not
secretly armed or did not divert from its flight path. Technology may
have become a problem if the negotiations had progressed, with respect
to the difference in US and Soviet reconnaissance capabilities at the time.
No quotas were to be established in the 1950s and since it was thought
that planes would be prepositioned at bases within each country, flights
would be carried out at shorter notice than is currently under discussion.
Two notable similarities exist in the Soviet position. Both in the 1950s
and today, the Soviet Union has objected to the fact that foreign military
bases, for example US military bases in Japan, are not included within
the scope of the proposal. Similarly, the Soviet Union has objected to the
lack of a direct link between the proposal and other arms control
measures. Both of these objections reflect the sense that the proposal's
hidden aim is to force the Soviet Union to prove itself and is a test of
Soviet willingness to meet Western standards.
Perhaps most importantly, the current situation is markedly different
from the world scene faced by President Eisenhower when he made his
Open Skies proposal in 1955. Satellites have been successfully developed
and used for reconnaissance purposes for a number of years. Their use as
gatherers of military intelligence is common and is considered legitimate.
They have played an important role, and indeed made possible, the
verification of strategic arms control treaties.
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In the mid-1950s nuclear missiles were a likely development, but had
not yet materialized in the military forces of the two superpowers.
Nuclear arsenals of the time consisted mainly of bombers armed with
nuclear weapons. Since then ballistic missiles have become an important
part of the nuclear arsenals of the US and the Soviet Union, as well as
China, France and Britain. Nuclear arsenals are deployed in a triad of
forces based on the ground, on submarines, and on bombers.
(iii) Arms Control
Still, there is a role to be played by aerial reconnaissance. Unlike the
absence of arms control treaties that characterized the late 1950's, the
present situation draws on a number of arms control agreements. In 1987
the US and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty for the Elimination of
Intermediate- and Shorter-range Missiles (the INF Treaty). It is the first
time that the superpowers have agreed to eliminate a class of missiles and
is the first time the superpowers have implemented a treaty requiring
extensive on-site inspection. The verification measures contained in the
INF Treaty are also important because they have come after a divisive
and politically charged superpower debate on arms control treaty
compliance.
On the other side of the coin, the verification problem has been made
more difficult by the development of new technologies and methods of
deployment. Cruise missiles now play an important role in the forces of
both the Soviet Union and the United States. Their small size and their
versatility, are a difficult challenge for verification techniques. Mobile
ICBMs, now deployed in the Soviet Union, and under development in
the US, also complicate the verification equation.
Aerial photography has a number of advantages over satellite
photography. It provides more flexibility than satellites because it can
reach a given area on short-notice. Satellites follow pre-determined routes
which may not cover the required area or may not get to it in time. In
some cases better resolution can be achieved because the aircraft can
photograph at low altitudes. Aircraft can also go back to a site more
frequently within a short time-frame.
An important role could be played by Open Skies with respect to the
current negotiations on conventional force reductions. Open Skies could
aid both sides by encouraging an atmosphere of confidence and by
providing concrete evidence that unilateral reductions have in fact been
carried out as promised. This avoids an atmosphere of political
accusation that sometimes surrounds unilateral reductions. It could also
be very useful in aiding verification measures related to an agreement on
reducing conventional forces, both before and after the agreement is
concluded.
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Negotiations on conventional forces involve a number of difficult and
complex issues, one of the most important of these is how to deal with
data requirements. How and whether to establish an agreed data base
proved to be a major issue of disagreement between the two sides in the
MBFR negotiations and contributed to a lengthy period of stalemate. A
system of aerial inspection related to force reductions in Europe could act
as an important confidence-building measure by indicating that a system
is feasible and by providing both sides with important data.
(iv) Political Problems
President Bush's Open Skies proposal has been couched in terms similar
to that of President Eisenhower's proposal. That is to say that it is not tied
to a specific agreement on arms control. Unlike Eisenhower, who was
faced with a very close Soviet society, the Bush proposal is intended to
push open an already encouragingly open Soviet society.
In 1955 the Open Skies proposal was put forward as a test of Soviet
seriousness about disarmament and as a way of testing an inspection
system. In the current circumstances, after years of relying on national
technical means (NTM) of verification, the use of the IAEA system to
monitor the NPT, and the implementation of a Stockholm Accord and
the INF Treaty, the need to test an inspection system no longer holds
water as a rational for the proposal. Under Gorbachev's leadership the
Soviet Union has moved towards deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons,
signed the INF Treaty, and announced unilateral troop reductions in
Europe. There seems, therefore, only limited need, if any, to best Soviet
seriousness about arms control.
The emphasis then falls, as it has done in the Bush speeches, on a desire
to test or expand openness in the Soviet Union. As with the Eisenhower
proposal, this emphasis gives the impression that the proposal is a
political ploy - the no-risk, drama and substance type of proposal that
drew Dulles' approval in 1955. This may particularly be the case given
Bush's need to be seen as taking the lead in arms control, rather than
simply responding to Soviet initiatives. In the absence of a connection to
specific reductions the familiar arguments come to the forefront: the
proposal is stacked against the Soviet Union, or worse it is simply a way
of collecting espionage information about the Soviet Union. This stigma
of political public relations has haunted the Open Skies proposal both in
the 1950s and in the current context.
There are two main objectives to the current proposal: confidence-
building, and aiding arms control. If successfully negotiated and
implemented, the system could be of great importance at a critical time
for East-West relations and for the future of Europe. The degree to which
Open Skies is successful in this regard will depend on the nature of the
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system that results. A system more limited than the one proposed by
NATO could still make a contribution. At the same time, there is also
room for a system which is not as alliance oriented as the one proposed
by NATO.
It is very important that, whatever the nature of the Open Skies system
that results, it be structured in such a way that it can adequately deal with
the changes that are likely to occur as Europe undergoes further
transition. This has been a key underlying issue in the current
negotiations. During discussions on the NATO Basic Elements paper
there was a strong difference of opinion between the US and France over
whether an Open Skies system could be based on a bloc-to-bloc system
or whether it should include all of the thirty-three European states
involved in the Conference on Security and Co-operation (CSCE) in
Europe. France advocated the wider system while the US wanted to keep
the proposal limited to the two alliances, at least until the system was in
operation. This failure to recognize the changing nature of Europe and
the Warsaw Pact alliance itself is a serious problem. If the Open Skies
negotiations manage to reach a final agreement as currently envisaged, its
success will depend entirely on the existence of a mechanism which will
take the regime beyond the now anachronistic alliance to alliance
structures.
Open Skies, in its revived format, appears to be following its
predecessor by simply fading from the superpower agenda. Its one hope
for success may stem from the inclusion of the members of the two
alliances at a time when the alliances and Europe itself are undergoing
tremendous transition. if a revised, flexible Open Skies regime can
provide new confidence, not just against surprise attack as was envisaged
in the 1950s, but confidence in an integrated and entrenched openness
among European states, it may be a useful process (rather than an end)
in developing new European arms control and political structures. As
such, its success would depend on the US and the Soviet Union
advocating Open Skies in this type of role. This seems at present, a
limited possibility.
